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The framework presents how trading in the foreign commodity futures market and the forward 
exchange market can affect the optimal spot positions of domestic commodity producers and traders. 
It generalizes the models of Kawai and Zilcha (1986) and Kofman and Viaene (1991) to allow both 
intermediate and final commodities to be traded in the international and futures markets, and the 
exporters/importers to face production shock, domestic factor costs and a random price. Applying 
mean-variance expected utility, we find that a rise in the expected exchange rate can raise both supply 
and demand for commodities and reduce domestic prices if the exchange rate elasticity of supply is 
greater than that of demand. Whether higher volatilities of exchange rate and foreign futures price can 
reduce the optimal spot position of domestic traders depends on the correlation between the exchange 
rate and the foreign futures price. Even though the forward exchange market is unbiased, and there is 
no correlation between commodity prices and exchange rates, the exchange rate can still affect 
domestic trading and prices through offshore hedging and international trade if the traders are 
interested in their profit in domestic currency. It illustrates how the world prices and foreign futures 
prices of commodities and their volatility can be transmitted to the domestic market as well as the 
dynamic relationship between intermediate and final goods prices. The equilibrium prices depends on 
trader behaviour i.e. who trades or does not trade in the foreign commodity futures and domestic 
forward currency markets. The empirical result applying a two-stage-least-squares approach to Thai 
rice and rubber prices supports the theoretical result. 
Keywords: commodity markets, offshore hedging, currency hedging, asset pricing, price transmission 
JEL Classification: F1; F3; G1; Q1 
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Price Transmission and Effects of Exchange Rates on Domestic Commodity Prices  
via Offshore and Currency Hedging 
 
1. Introduction 
Many frameworks try to explain the behaviour of traders and commodity prices in an 
economy that has both commodity spot and futures markets. However, some small countries are the 
world’s largest exporters or importers of commodities, and they do not have their own commodity 
futures market. The domestic traders in these small countries are price takers. The world prices can 
therefore affect domestic commodity prices, and higher volatility of world prices can have an adverse 
effect on these small economies. For example, in the first half of 2008 the rise in oil prices raised the 
demand for biofuel and pushed up the prices of sugar and starch crops (e.g. corn, wheat and rice). It 
also increased production costs of synthetic rubber and thus increased the demand for substitutes (e.g. 
natural rubber). Many importing countries such as South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines suffered 
from these changes while exporting countries had higher export incomes and simultaneously faced 
economic instability due to higher volatility of commodity prices. For instance, Thailand, which is the 
world’s largest exporter of milled rice, sugar and rubber products, benefited from commodity price 
rises. That is, Thai export growth increased, and thus Thailand experienced a resilient economic 
growth in spite of facing higher fuel import bills. However, at the same time Thai people suffered 
from a continuous increase in the domestic prices of rice and sugar, which are the main food staples of 
the country; more rice and sugar were exported due to the higher world prices, leaving the country 
with a lower supply. Later, the commodity prices dropped following a sharp fall in oil prices in July 
2008. This caused a decrease in Thai export growth, farm incomes and the profits of mills as well as 
rubber sheet manufacturers, leading to a reduction of private consumption growth. As a result, 
economic growth dropped from 0.8% y-o-y in the first half of 2008 to -0.7 and -4.9% y-o-y in the 
third and fourth quarters of 2008, respectively. 
From this, we can see that traders facing price risk are not only exporters, but also producers, 
processors and storage companies. Without a domestic futures market, domestic traders can only 
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hedge their price risk in the foreign commodity futures markets or use the foreign futures prices as 
information in predicting future commodity prices. For example, before the Agricultural Futures 
Exchange of Thailand (AFET) started trading futures contracts for smoked rubber sheets in May 2004 
and futures contracts for milled rice in August 2004, Thai rubber traders hedged their price risk in the 
Singapore Commodity Exchange (SICOM) or used the SICOM's smoked rubber sheet futures prices 
to forecast the future price of rubber1 and Thai rice traders traded on the Chicago Board of Trade 
(CBOT) or used the CBOT's rough rice price to forecast the future price of rice2. This raises a concern 
about whether exchange rates can affect domestic commodity prices also through foreign futures 
trading. 
Kawai and Zilcha (1986) found that if an economy has only a forward foreign exchange 
market, exports can be increased by the introduction of domestic commodity futures markets. Many 
recent papers have computed the optimal offshore hedging strategy for exporters or importers. Kawai 
and Zilcha (1986) and Kofman and Viaene (1991) found the exporters' optimal strategy in the case of 
incomplete markets where there is no commodity futures market in the economy. Their models 
focused on an intermediate commodity which was storable, quoted in the foreign demanding country's 
currency and traded in the international and futures markets. Jin and Koo (2002) developed a 
theoretical model to find a hedging strategy when the traders face hedging costs; in their empirical 
work they also found the optimal hedging ratio for Japanese wheat importers who hedged their price 
risk in the CBOT and hedged exchange rate risk in the Tokyo International Financial Futures 
Exchange (TIFFE). Empirically, Yun and Kim (2010) found that Korean oil importers' hedging would 
be more effective if they hedged their price risk in the foreign futures market and simultaneously 
entered into currency futures contracts. While these models have focused on optimal strategies for 
exporters of intermediate commodities, some small countries allow exports of final goods only e.g. 
                                                            
1 There are more Thai traders trading the futures contract of smoked rubber sheet in the SICOM than in other 
futures market because the Singapore is the largest port shipping smoked rubber sheet for Thailand and 
Malaysia, the world largest exporters of smoked rubber sheet. 
2 For the case of rice, there are more Thai traders trading in the CBOT than in other futures market because the 
US is one of the largest importers of Thai milled rice. However, rice traded at the CBOT is rough rice, not 
milled rice. 
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Thai rough rice and natural rubber cannot be exported due to the nature of the products, a much higher 
delivery cost, and regulations. For some commodities e.g. sugar and oil, both intermediate and final 
commodities (raw sugar and refined sugar, or crude oil and refined oil) can be exported. Unlike 
others, Kofman and Viaene (1991) specified the optimal offshore hedging strategy of domestic 
processors as well as their exporting counterparts. 
Some papers have focused on analysing the empirical relationship between exchange rates 
and world commodity prices. Investigating the relation between the world price of milled rice (Thai 
milled rice price) and the Thai Baht (THB)-US Dollar (USD) exchange rate, Kofman and Viaene 
(1991) found a positive ex-post correlation coefficient while Gilbert (1991) found that the exchange 
rate elasticity was equal to -1. Applying a Granger Causality test, Timmer (2009) found that the Euro-
USD exchange rate significantly Granger caused the world prices of commodities e.g. rice, corn, 
wheat, crude oil and palm oil. Using the world commodity price indices, Chen, Rogoff and Rossi 
(2010) showed that exchange rates had significant power in forecasting commodity prices. While 
world prices and domestic prices can be highly correlated, they are unnecessarily equal. It is 
interesting to know how exchange rates can affect domestic commodity prices too, especially through 
trading activities other than exporting or importing. 
An aim of this paper is to develop a framework to explain the effects of trading in the foreign 
commodity futures and domestic currency markets on the domestic commodity market of a small 
country; it also examines how exchange rates can affect domestic commodity prices through this 
trading. The framework here expands the models of Kawai and Zilcha (1986) and Kofman and Viaene 
(1991), allowing both intermediate and final commodities to be traded in the international market. The 
futures market can trade either the intermediate commodity or final commodity. Some of their 
assumptions are also relaxed e.g. exporters and importers face export and import uncertainties, as well 
as domestic factor costs. By applying a two-period mean-variance approach3, the agents' optimal 
commodity spot and futures holdings and optimal forward exchange holding in this particular case are 
                                                            
3 Cochrane (2001) has proved that if the condition holds at each period, then the infinite-period and two-period 
consumption-based models can give equivalent results. 
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specified. Unlike the framework for a country which has its own futures markets, the framework in 
this paper shows that the degree of risk aversion can affect the optimal spot position when the country 
does not have its own futures market. We then derive the equilibrium prices in the domestic 
commodity markets. We find that relationships among optimal strategies, equilibrium prices, and 
exchange rates depend upon not only whether commodity prices and the exchange rates are 
correlated, but also which product is exported, whether exports are contracted in advance, and which 
traders hedge their price and exchange rate risks. Even if the forward foreign exchange rate is 
unbiased and there is no correlation between commodity prices and exchange rates, there are still 
some exchange rate effects on the commodity prices via exporting/importing and trading in the 
foreign futures market if the agents are interested in their profits in domestic currency. Higher 
volatilities of the exchange rate and the foreign futures price can affect the optimal forward position, 
and thus the optimal futures and spot positions. The framework also shows how world prices are 
transmitted to domestic intermediate and final commodity markets. Higher volatilities of domestic and 
world prices of the commodity will reduce both demand and supply of the commodity, but their 
impacts on price will depend on whether supply or demand is affected more.  
For empirical analysis, we use data on Thai rice and Thai rubber prices as well as the 
exchange rates of the THB against the USD and Singapore Dollar (SGD) before futures contracts 
were first traded in the AFET. Our empirical findings support the theoretical result arrived at. With 
the exception of the correlation between the exchange rate and the world price of smoked rubber 
sheets (in domestic currency), contemporaneous correlations of exchange rates with commodity prices 
(in domestic currency) are insignificant in both commodity markets. The inefficient forward exchange 
market allows the forward exchange rate to have a direct impact on the optimal spot position and the 
prices in the rubber markets.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, the theoretical framework is 
developed to find the optimal strategies and equilibrium prices. In Section 3, a two-stage-least-squares 
regression analysis shows how prices of intermediate and final commodities are related and how they 
are affected by world prices, foreign futures prices and exchange rates. Section 4 concludes and 
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suggests some further research. 
 
2. Framework 
2.1 Assumptions 
In this framework, both intermediate and final commodities are storable and internationally 
tradable in a small country which does not have its own commodity futures market, but has a spot 
commodity market and a forward exchange market. The two-period mean-variance expected utility 
maximization is applied to find the optimal strategies of domestic traders: producers, processors, 
exporters (or importers), and storage companies. Production and trade flows among domestic traders 
of intermediate and final commodities of an exporting country and an importing country are shown in 
Figure 1(a) and Figure 1(b), respectively. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
We assume that the production process, storage and international delivery take one period 
(i.e. traders hold the positions for a single-period horizon), and in each period both intermediate and 
final commodities are traded in domestic and international markets. The intermediate producers 
choose the optimal level of input (e.g. primary commodity) at period t to produce the intermediate 
commodity and sell their output to the domestic market at period t+1 at price Pt+1. With the optimal 
level of input (intermediate commodity) chosen at period t, processors produce the final commodity 
and sell it to domestic storage companies and exporters at period t+1 at price Qt+1. Storage companies 
can hold a spot position in the domestic market of intermediate or final commodity and close their 
position in the next period to make a profit. In the framework of an exporting country, exporters buy 
the commodities from the domestic market; after packaging the exporters deliver the commodities to 
the foreign importers and get paid in foreign currency in the next period at the world prices (Pmt+1 and 
Qmt+1 which are quoted in foreign currency). In the framework for a country which is the world’s  
importer of commodities, importers buy commodities from abroad at the world prices (Pmt and Qmt) at 
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period t and sell them to the domestic market after receiving commodities in the next period at price 
(Pt+1 and Qt+1). 
 i   is the profit of trader i where  i=f  for the intermediate producers,  i=p  for the 
processors,  i=s for the storage companies and  i=e for the exporters. Note that in period t, all 
stochastic variables of time t+1 are unknown. In the sequel, Xit denotes the position of the tader of 
type i in the primary good at time t and similarly for Yit (intermediate good), Hit (final good), 
f
itY (futures contract for the intermediate or final commodity) and 
f
itZ (the forward exchange 
contract). The framework also has assumptions as follows. 
Assumption 1: As the country does not have a commodity futures market, domestic traders can hedge 
their price risk in the foreign commodity futures market, in which either the intermediate or final 
commodity is traded. The futures prices are quoted in foreign currency. Traders can enter into the 
futures contract with a full margin at time t which is worth tt
f
it eFY  in domestic currency. The 
maturity of the futures and forward contracts is at time t+1. It follows that all domestic traders close 
their futures position by the last trading day of period t+1 by a cash settlement because delivering to 
or taking delivery from the foreign futures market requires substantial additional costs, or the 
commodity traded in the foreign futures market is different from the commodity of which price risk is 
hedged. Therefore, all traders transfer the cash (in foreign currency) through the clearinghouse both at 
time t and t +1 i.e. the payment on t
f
it FY is made at time t with the exchange rate et  and the payment 
on 1t
f
it FY  is made at time t+1 to close futures position with the exchange rate et+1. 
Assumption 2: Due to international trade and foreign futures trading, traders face exchange rate risk. 
To hedge exchange rate risk, traders can short or long the forward exchange contract at time t, based 
on the expected future payment or receipt (in foreign currency). Unlike the trade in the futures market, 
there is no margin requirement in the forward market so the payment in the forward exchange market 
is only made at maturity t+1. After the cash transfer, the foreign currency remaining in their hands 
can be sold to the spot exchange market. If their actual payment (receipt) in foreign currency is larger 
(smaller) than fitZ , they can also buy more foreign currency in the spot market. 
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Assumption 3: At time t, all traders choose their optimal decisions by maximising their expected 
utility function (V) depending on their profit in domestic currency. Any variables such as the optimal 
spot and futures positions chosen by trader i at time t depend on his own information set available at 
time t (Iit). Eit( ) denotes trader i's expectation depending on Iit.  Varit( ) denotes trader i's expected 
variance of a variable depending on  Iit. The discount factor, ρ, is assumed to be 1/(1+it+1)  where  it+1 
is the domestic interest rate at time t+1 and perfectly foreseen at time t. 
Assumption 4: Domestic traders in a commodity market are rational and are small in the international 
commodity market, foreign futures market and forward exchange market relatively to trading volume 
in the markets. So here we derive only the equilibrium prices in the domestic commodity spot 
markets. With this assumption, the expected future exchange rate perceived by trader i (Eit(et+1)) 
equals the expected exchange rate perceived by the market (Et(et+1)). Unlike the assumption of 
Battermann, Braulke, Broll and Schimmelpfennig (2000), here Eit(et+1) is not necessarily equal to the 
forward exchange rate, ft  i.e.  ft = Et(et+1) +  risk premium. This risk premium can be time varying.  
Assumption 5: Production shock, storage and export uncertainty, noise trading in the commodity 
futures and forward foreign exchange markets are uncorrelated and do not have serial correlations. 
The domestic spot and forward exchange markets are insignificantly affected by production shock, 
storage uncertainty and the uncertainty of commodity futures prices. 
Assumption 6: The commodity prices in domestic and international markets can be different. Many 
exported commodities are important commodities for the exporting countries and thus the domestic 
agricultural sector is protected by the government through its intervention schemes4.  
2.2 Profit Functions 
Intermediate producers 
A producer buys seeds (the primary commodity) at time t to produce the intermediate 
                                                            
4 For instance, while rice and sugar are main export products of Thailand, they are the main food of the country 
too. For rough rice, the government may set a guarantee price at which the government will buy from farmers 
and provide cheap loans for farmers e.g. the rice-mortgage scheme was introduced in September 2011; under 
this scheme, the government buys rice from farmers at about twice of the normal market price. For sugar which 
is main ingredient of Thai food, the government sets a ceiling price to help consumers and processors. 
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commodity and sells his output ),,( 1tft lXf  5 in the spot market at time t+1. We assume that the 
production shock, εt+1 has Eft(εt+1)=0 and Varft(εt+1)= 2 . The production shock is realised just before 
delivering the output to the spot market at time t+1. 2ftX  is the production cost excluding the cost of 
seeds (θ>0). He can hedge his price risk by selling futures contracts maturing at time t+1, fftY , at price 
Ft in the foreign futures market at time t. His profit function is, therefore, 
}.)())(({ 1111
2 f
fttt
f
ftttfttftftt
f
fttf ZfeYXfPXXrY     
where rt is the primary commodity price and Фt  (= Ftet) is the foreign futures price (Ft) at time t 
converted into the unit of domestic currency using the exchange rate et. Because of closing futures 
position with cash settlement, he faces exchange rate risk which he can hedge by buying forward 
exchange contracts maturing at time t+1, fftZ , at the forward rate ft . After taking delivery of the 
amount of foreign currency  fftZ   from the forward exchange market, he may sell his excess foreign 
currency  1 tfftfft FYZ   in the spot exchange market at t+1 if his actual payment (in foreign 
currency) to the futures market at time t+1 is smaller than  fftZ  . On the other hand, he may buy more 
foreign currency from the spot exchange if  1 tfftfft FYZ  . Alternatively, he may choose to buy the 
exact amount of the foreign currency which he has to pay to the futures market from the spot 
exchange market at time t+1 at the rate et+1 and thus .0fftZ    
Processors 
At time t, a processor purchases the intermediate commodity to produce the final 
commodity ),,( 11   tpypt vkYgH 6. We assume that the production shock, ,1t  is realised just before 
delivering the output to the spot market at time t+1 and that  1t  has a zero mean and a constant 
                                                            
5 1
2/1
11 },min{   tftft lbXY   where l  is other inputs and 0<b<1. Therefore, the cost function is equal to the 
cost of seeds and the other production cost which depends on the amount of input used in the production. 
6
1
2/1
1 }),(min{   tptpt kYaH   where  k  is other inputs and  0<a<1. Therefore, the cost function is equal to the 
cost of intermediate goods and the other production cost which depends on the amount of intermediate goods 
used in the production. 
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variance ( ).2v   2ptY  is the other production cost which depends on the amount of intermediate 
commodity. He sells his output at time t+1 in the domestic market at price Qt+1. At time t, he can also 
sell foreign futures contracts of intermediate or final goods maturing at time t+1 ( fptY ) to hedge his 
price risk. Then, at time t+1, he closes all of his futures position by buying futures contracts at price 
Ft+1. He can also hedge his exchange rate risk by buying the forward exchange contract, fptZ . After 
taking delivery of fptZ , he may buy more (sell excess) foreign currency in the spot exchange market if 
it turns out that he has underhedged (overhedged) his exchange rate risk. Instead, he may choose not 
to hedge his exchange rate risk ( )0fptZ , and then buy 1tfpt FY  in the spot exchange market at the 
rate et+1 at time t+1.  Consequently, a processor's profit function is  
})())(({ 11111
2 f
pttt
f
ptttpttptptt
f
pttp ZfeYvYgQYYPY    
Storage companies 
A storage company purchases the intermediate or final commodity from the domestic market 
at time t+1 and sells it to the domestic market at time t+1 to make a profit. The storage cost is 2stY  
for the company storing the intermediate commodity and 2stH  for the company storing the final 
commodity where 0<γ<1.  ytw 1  and htw 1  denote storage uncertainties for the intermediate commodity 
and the final commodity, respectively. We assume that both uncertainties have mean values of zero 
and constant variances and that ytwCov 1(  , 0)1 htw . At time t, the manager can hedge his price risk 
by selling the futures contract maturing at time t+1 at price Ft.  He then closes his futures position in 
the period t+1 at price Ft+1. In addition, he can hedge his exchange rate risk due to the payment to the 
futures market at time t+1 with the forward exchange contract at the forward rate, ft. Like other trader 
types, he may sell excess or buy more in the spot exchange market if he has overhedged or 
underhedged his exchange rate risk. Or else, he may choose to buy the amount of the foreign currency 
from the spot exchange market at t+1 at the rate et+1. Thereby, the profit of the company that stores 
the intermediate commodity is  
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  }.)({ 11112 fstttfsttytsttststtfstts ZfeYwYPYYPY    
For the company that stores the final commodity, the company's profit function is  
  }.)({ 11112 fstttfstthtsttststtfstts ZfeYwHQHHQY    
International Trade: Exporters/Importers 
At time t, an exporter commits to export the intermediate or final commodity, so he purchases 
the commodity at time t and export it at price (Pmt+1 or Qmt+1) at time t+1. Like Kawai and Zilcha 
(1986), we assume that export prices at time t+1 are random. His total production cost is the cost of 
purchase ( ettYP  or )ett HQ   plus delivery and transaction costs  
2( etY  or )2etH  where 0<β<1.  ytu 1  
and htu 1   denote export uncertainties for intermediate goods and final goods. We assume that each has 
a zero mean and a constant variance and that ytuCov 1(  , 0)1 htu . He can also hedge his price risk in 
the foreign futures market by selling the futures contract, which matures at time t+1, at time t and 
then closing the futures position at time t+1. Simultaneously, he can hedge his exchange rate risk due 
to the payment to the futures market at time t+1 by purchasing the forward exchange contract at time t 
at the forward rate ft. He may sell excess in the spot exchange market if it turns out that he has 
overhedged his exchange rate risk. If he chooses not to hedge his exchange rate risk, he may buy 
foreign currency from the spot exchange market at t+1 at the rate et+1. The profit function of the 
intermediate goods exporter is  
  }.)({ 111112 fetttfettytettmtetettfette ZfeYuYePYYPY    
while the final goods exporter's profit function is 
  }.)({ 111112 fetttfetthtettmtetettfette ZfeYuHeQHHQY    
In the framework of an imported commodity, the importer's input costs is the world prices, 
Pmt and Qmt while the commodity is sold to the domestic market at time t+1 at the domestic price, Pt+1 
and Qt+1. Given that he makes decision at time t, he faces price risk from selling the commodity to the 
domestic market and also exchange rate risk from offshore hedging. 
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2.3 Optimal Strategies 
Each trader chooses his optimal commodity spot position, commodity futures position and 
forward exchange position by maximising the mean-variance expected utility depending on their 
profits. The general form of the profit function for the trader of type i is  
).(
})()({
1
1111
2




itit
f
itttt
f
itititititiititt
f
iti ZfeYSMSSCY


 
Let Sit be the vector of the spot positions i.e. )( ftXf  for i=f, )(

ptYg for  i=p, 

itY or

itH  for i=s,e
7. 
1itM  is the price of product sold by the trade of type i: Pt+1 for the producer and the company storing 
or importing the intermediate commodity, Qt+1 for the processor and the company storing or 
importing the final commodity, Pmt+1 et+1 for the exporter of the intermediate commodity, and Qmt+1 
et+1 for the exporter of the final commodity. Cit is the input cost per unit of output: rt/b for the 
producer, Pt/a  for the processor,  Pt  for the company storing or exporting intermediate goods, Qt  for 
the company storing or exporting final goods, Pmtet and Qmtet for the importers of intermediate and 
final commodities. 1it  is production shock for the producer and the processor, storage uncertainty 
for storage companies, and export (import) uncertainty for exporters (importers). The decision is made 
at time t, so the domestic net supply of intermediate and final commodities at time t+1 depends on the 
input that producers, processors and storage companies bought at time t. The objective function is  
)()( 11
,,
  itititititi
ZYS
UEUVMax
f
it
f
itit
   
That is, the two-period expected utility is maximised with respect to the spot position (Xft for  i=f, itY   
for i=p, and itY or itH  for  i=s,e), the futures position (
f
itY ) and the forward position (
f
itZ ). 
                                                            
7The optimal spot position of the producer is ftX while the optimal spot position for the processor is .

ptY  From 
this, we also find the optimal output level at time t+1 regardless of additive production shocks i.e. )( ftXf  for 
the producer and )( ptYg for the processor. For storage companies, the optimal spot position is trading volume, 
not the stock of commodity, at time t which is carried forward to the period t+1. The optimal position at time t is 
denoted as stY  for the company storing intermediate goods and 

stH for the company storing final goods. 

etY  
and etH are the optimal positions at time t for the exporter of intermediate goods and the exporter of final 
goods, respectively. 
13 
 
The optimal spot position 
Solving the first order conditions (see Appendix A) yields the vector of the optimal spot 
positions,  
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where  i   is equal to  22b   for the farmer,  22a   for the processor,  2γ for the storage company, 2β for 
the exporters (importers). 0i  if there is no other costs apart from the cost of purchase.  We 
assume that  0),( 11  ititit MCov  . This is because a decrease in the supply of the commodities due 
to a negative shock (e.g. weather and rotting) will raise the commodity price.  
Unlike Anderson and Danthine (1983), Antoniou (1986), and Benninga and Oosterhof (2004) 
in which the country has its own futures market, the optimal spot position here depends on trading in 
other markets and the degree of risk aversion; thus, the separation theorem is not applicable. When the 
expected gain in the spot, futures or forward market increases, the traders tend to hold a larger spot 
position. Like Kawai and Zilcha (1986), Kofman and Viaene (1986) and Schmittmann (2010), the 
failure of uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) allows currency hedging to have a direct impact on the 
spot position. While higher volatility of domestic and world commodity prices and their correlation 
with the exchange rate can cause a reduction of the optimal spot position, higher correlation between 
domestic output prices and foreign futures prices increases the optimal spot position (See Appendix 
B). Volatilities of the exchange rate and the foreign futures price can affect the optimal spot position; 
the effects depend on (i) the correlation between the exchange rate and the foreign futures price and 
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(ii) the effect of the correlation on the optimal spot position. This is supported by the finding of 
Bahmani-Oskooee and Mitra (2008) that exchange rate volatility has negative impacts on exports and 
imports of commodities between the US and India. The effects of these on the profit of traders are in 
the same direction as those on the optimal spot positions if the expected marginal gain of trading in 
futures and forward markets is non-negative and that the marginal revenue product (MRP) of input is 
not less than its marginal resource cost (MRC). 
If there is no correlation between commodity prices (Pt+1, Q t+1, Qmt+1, Pmt+1, Ft+1) and the 
exchange rate (et+1), )()()( 111   tittittit eEFEE for all i and )( 1itit ME for the exporters are  
)()( 11  tetmtet eEPE   and  ).()( 11  tetmtet eEQE  The correlations of the exchange rate with the foreign 
futures price and the world prices denominated in domestic currency are still non-zero. Therefore, 
even though there is no direct relation between commodity prices and exchange rates, the optimal spot 
positions of traders are still affected by the expected future value and volatility of exchange rate 
through offshore hedging, currency hedging and international trade. 
If the forward market is also unbiased, the last term in profit function disappears for all i. 
Without speculative currency holding or with ),( 11  titit eMCorr =0 and ),( 11  ttit eCorr =0, the 
optimal position will be  
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Equation (2) is not affected directly by the exchange rates but indirectly through foreign futures 
trading and international trade (see Appendix C). The second term of Equation (1) and (2) is the effect 
of futures trading. As the denominator of Equation (2) is larger than χit, the sum of the first two terms 
of Equation (1) is larger than Equation (2); combined with the effect of speculative trading in the 
forward foreign exchange market on the optimal spot position, Equation (1) » Equation (2). Equation 
(2) is also the optimal position for the case that 1) the economy does not have a forward foreign 
exchange market or 2) the trader hedges only his price risk. 
If traders do not hold a futures position or if they are not allowed to trade in the foreign 
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futures market, the traders except exporters do not need to hedge exchange rate risk. In this case, 
Equation (1) will become  
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for all i. If the trader does not trade in the foreign futures market but use the futures price to predict 
the future spot price, )( 1tit ME  in Equation (3) will be a function of Ft.  As Equation (3) < Equation 
(2) < Equation (1), allowing the trader to hedge his risks in the foreign futures market and the 
domestic forward exchange market will raise production level and supply of commodity in the 
domestic market. How much the spot position increases also depends on the correlation between 
commodity prices and exchange rates and the bias of the forward exchange market. 
Unlike other trader types, exporters face exchange rate risk even though they do not trade in 
the foreign commodity futures market. If they choose to hedge their price risk in the offshore futures 
market, then they face more exchange rate risk. If they do not trade in the futures market but hedge 
the exchange rate risk of their export incomes,  ),( 11  ttit eCorr  and  ),( 11   titit MCorr  disappear 
from Equation (1). As a result, the second term disappears and the last term is reduced; therefore, their 
optimal spot position becomes smaller than the optimal position given by Equation (1) but greater 
than the optimal position given by Equation (3). 
Now let us consider a case in which the exporters precommit at time t to export the 
intermediate (final) commodity at time t +1 at the preset export price Pmt+1 (Qmt+1).  Practically, the 
preset price can be determined by the current export price and thus Pmt+1 (Qmt+1) are known at time t as 
assumed by Kofman and Viaene (1991) and Benninga and Oosterhof (2004). The exporters have no 
need to hedge price risk. The optimal positions will be  
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for intermediate good exporters and 
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for final good exporters. 
In the case that the final good is produced within a short period of time i.e. the processors can 
buy the intermediate commodity to produce the final good and sell the output to the market within the 
same period, they do not face any price risk and have no need to trade in the foreign commodity 
futures and forward foreign exchange markets. Then, their optimal spot position is 
 
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tty
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Y p
  (6) 
where  
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pt
p Y
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yg 
 )(  . 
The optimal futures position 
The optimal futures position of the trader of type i is 
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for all i. The optimal futures position has 2 components: speculation and hedging. The first two terms 
are effects of speculation in the foreign commodity futures market and the forward foreign exchange 
market. YitH  is the hedging component: 
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for all i. HitY  is a partial hedge of the expected output level. Whether the trader will short or long the 
contract depends on the expected gains in the foreign futures and forward foreign exchange markets, 
and his spot position.  
If traders do not hedge their exchange rate risk,  fitZ   is zero for all  i  . Then the second term 
disappears and so do some of the covariance terms in Equation (7). The optimal position reduces to 
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If ),(),(),( 111111   titittititttit eMCorrMCorreCorr , itHit SY /   in Equation (8) is greater than 
in Equation (7) i.e. offshore hedging is more effective when they hedge both price and exchange rate 
risks. This is supported by empirical findings of Yun and Kim (2010). 
The size of futures position may be affected by the type of commodity traded in the foreign 
futures market through the futures price and ).,( 11   titit MCov   For example, the covariance 
between the domestic price of final (intermediate) commodity and the foreign futures price of 
intermediate (final) commodity may be lower than the covariance between the domestic prices and the 
foreign futures price of the same commodity. The optimal spot and forward positions are also affected 
through the change in futures position. 
The optimal forward position 
The optimal forward position of the trader of type i is 
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Obviously,  fitZ   is composed of two components: speculation (the first term) and hedging (the last 
two terms). The second term of Equation (9) is a partial hedge of the expected payment or receipts of 
foreign currency due to closing futures position at time t+1 and its last term is a partial hedge of the 
expected future receipts from the spot market. If commodity prices and exchange rate are 
uncorrelated, the second term will become a full hedge,  ),( 1

tit
f
it FEY   and the last term will be zero 
for all traders except exporters. 
In short, the optimal spot position is affected by the degree of risk aversion and thus the 
separation theorem is not applicable. Without hedging price risk in the foreign futures market or 
exchange rate risk in the domestic forward market, the spot commodity markets will have both lower 
demand and lower supply. For all traders, all optimal positions are affected by the type of commodity 
traded in the foreign futures market only through the futures prices and covariance between output 
prices and foreign futures prices. Note that by changing the subscript t to be t-1, we can get the 
optimal positions at time t-1 for all traders. 
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2.4 Equilibrium price at maturity 
The market-clearing conditions for the domestic markets of intermediate and final 
commodities in an exporting country at time t are 
  ][)( 11 ytststftfstseteptp wYnXfnYnYnYn      (10) 
and  
   ,11 htststptpctstsete wHnaYnHHnHn      (11) 
respectively.  ctH   is the demand for final goods of consumers at time  t, assuming to be linear with 
the current domestic price i.e. tct dQcH  .  ni denotes the number of the traders of type i. The left-
hand side represents the demand in the spot market while the right-hand side represents the supply8. 
As domestic traders are small in the international market and the foreign futures and forward 
exchange markets, the futures price, export prices and spot and forward exchange rates are exogenous. 
With both equilibrium conditions, the domestic equilibrium spot prices of intermediate and 
final commodities at time t are specified. The supply of commodities does not depend on the current 
domestic spot prices. It depends on the domestic spot prices of inputs, the foreign futures price and the 
forward exchange rate at time t-1, as well as the expected future prices and exchange rate perceived 
by producers and storage companies at time t-1. In contrast, the demand for commodities at time t 
depends on the current spot price, futures price and exchange rates. It also depends on the expected 
exchange rate and the expected prices of commodities sold at time t+1 in the domestic commodity 
market, the world market and the foreign futures commodity market, perceived by traders at time t.  
So from Equation (10), 
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where   pitY ,   =  ,it
itP
itS    denoting the optimal position of the trader of type i excluding the effect of  
Pt. Consequently, 
                                                            
8 For the importing country, Ye and He are on the supply side. 
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From Equation (11), the equilibrium price of final goods in the domestic market is 
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where  qitH , denotes the optimal position of the trader of type i excluding the effect of  tQ   e.g.  
,, cH qct     and   qitH ,  =  ititQitS   for i=e and s. Equation (12) and (13) supports the assumption 
given above that  .0),( 11  ititit MCov    Moreover, storage companies or the buffer stock's manager 
can raise the current spot price by buying more of the commodity at time t. 
The domestic equilibrium prices depend on whether the forward exchange market is unbiased, 
which trader types hedge price and exchange rate risks, and whether exports are contracted in advance 
1) if the forward exchange market is not unbiased,  1itS   is given by Equation (1),  
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2) if the forward exchange market is unbiased, traders do not hedge exchange rate risk, or  
0),(1  titit eMCorr  and 0),(1  ttit eCorr   for all i,  1itS   is given by Equation (2),   pitY ,  and 
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3) if traders do not hold a futures position or if they are not allowed to trade in the foreign futures 
market,  1itS   for the traders except exporters is given by Equation (3),  
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4) if exports are contracted in advance,  
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Thus, Equation (12) can be rewritten as a general form: 
 ptjtitjtitttttttt ffPrfP   ),,,,,,,,,( 111111  (14) 
where i=f,s  and j=p,e,s. it and 1 jt are sets of the expected future price and exchange rate perceived 
by the trader of type i at time t e.g. )(),( 11   tittit EPE and )( 1tit eE , and the expected future price and 
exchange rate perceived by the trader of type j at time t+1 e.g. )( 21  tpt QE , )( 21,  ttsy PE , 
),( 221,  tmttey ePE )( 21   tjtE and )( 2tjt eE , respectively. it and 1 jt are sets of expected variances 
and correlations of future prices and exchange rates, perceived by the trader of type i at time t and the 
trader of type j at time t+1, respectively. pt  = - )( 11 ytsytf wnn   ; it has a mean value of 0 and a 
constant variance. 
Likewise, Equation (13) can be rewritten as a general function:  
 qtmtktmtktttttttt ffQPfQ   ),,,,,,,,,( 111111  (15) 
where k=p,s and m=e,s. )}(),(),({ 111   tkttkttktkt eEEQE  and )({ 21  tstmt QE , 
)( 221  tmtet eQE , )( 21   tmtE , )}.( 2tmt eE  kt  and 1mt  are sets of expected variances and 
covariances of final goods prices, the futures price and the exchange rate, perceived by the trader of 
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type k at time t and the trader of type m at time t+1, respectively.  ηqt = -( )11 htshtp wnvn   ; it has a 
mean value of 0 and a constant variance. 
If the forward market is unbiased, all traders do not hedge exchange rate risk, or 
0),( 11  titit eMCorr  and 0),( 11   ttit eCorr  for all i, then there is no direct effect of the forward 
rate, the expected value and variance of the exchange rate on domestic commodity prices, but via the 
world spot prices and foreign futures prices of commodities which are converted into the unit of 
domestic currency.   
As can be seen from Equation (1) and (2), the optimal spot position can be affected by 
)( 1 titVar or )( 1tit eVar . Thus the equilibrium prices are also affected by exchange rate volatility. 
However, whether the effect is positive or negative depends on (i) which traders hedge their price and 
exchange rate risks, (ii) the sign of ),( 11  ttit eCorr and (iii) the exchange rate elasticity of supply 
and demand. This is supported by the conclusion of Chu and Morrison (1984) that one of the 
dominant sources of commodity price variability was the volatility of exchange rates. Appendix B 
shows that an increase in the expected value of world prices and a decrease in their volatilities will 
raise export volume. The increase in export volume causes the domestic demand for commodities, 
which are the input, to increase; therefore, the domestic prices of commodities increase as can be seen 
from Equation (12) and (13). This finding explains what happened to Thai rice and sugar markets in 
2008. In the case that the country is the importer of commodities, if the current world price increases, 
import volume will decrease; it lowers the domestic supply of commodities and thus increases the 
domestic price. This finding can explain the recent increase in fuel prices in many countries. So the 
world price and domestic prices are positively correlated in both exporting and importing countries. 
 
3. Empirical studies 
Based on the theoretical result in the previous section, trading in the foreign commodity 
futures market and the forward exchange market affect the domestic spot prices through the 
speculative component of traders' optimal spot holding.  In this section, the determinants of spot 
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prices at maturity are investigated empirically. The aim is to find whether domestic spot prices are 
affected by the foreign futures price and the spot and forward exchange rates through trading in the 
offshore commodity futures market and the currency market. This paper applies the Thai rice and 
rubber markets as case studies. As Thailand only exports final goods of rice and rubber (milled rice 
and smoked rubber sheet (RSS)), 01 etY  and domestic prices are not affected by the world price of 
the intermediate goods. The export prices of milled rice and RSS3 in this empirical study are Thai 
F.O.B. prices. 
In the case of Thai rubber, the first futures contract of smoked rubber sheets traded in the 
AFET matured in September 2004. The domestic prices of intermediate and final goods applied in 
this study are the prices of natural rubber sheets and smoked rubber sheets no.3 (RSS3) which have 
been recorded by the Thai Office of the Rubber Replanting Aid Fund since 1998, so the analysis 
covers the period from January 1998 to May 2004. Rubber tree takes many years to grow, so the 
production cost is mainly fixed and the cost of seed is relatively small and so can be ignored ( 0tr ). 
The futures price of RSS3 is the price of a futures contract traded at SICOM. There are 12 maturity 
months i.e. 12 calendar months. The last trading day is the last working day of the maturity month. 
For this case study, spot and 1-month forward exchange rates are in THB/SGD. So there are a total of 
77 monthly observations employed. 
In the case of Thai rice, the futures contract maturing in November 2004 was the first contract 
of milled rice traded in the AFET. The foreign futures price applied here is the U.S. rough rice futures 
price. The CBOT trades rough rice futures contracts with 6 maturity months: January, March, May, 
July, September, and November. The last trading day is the mid of the maturity month. To exclude the 
effect of exchange rate regime switching on July 2, 1997, we use the mid-month data within the 
period from July 1997 to June 2004. The domestic prices are the Thai rough rice and milled rice 
prices in maturity months. The primary commodity of rough rice is rough rice, so rt = Pt. The spot and 
2-month forward exchange rates are in THB/USD. In total, there are 46 observations for this case. 
To simplify the solution and to allow the model to be easily estimated, we assume that, for 
each agent, conditional variances and covariances of prices and production shocks are constant 
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through time9. Before estimating the system of equations, the KPSS unit root test is applied to test the 
stationarity of the variables. The null hypothesis of the KPSS test is that each series is stationary. As 
shown in Table l, all variables are stationary at the 0.01 significance level. So this assumption is valid. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Table 2 supports the correlation conditions assumed in the theoretical framework. It also 
shows that the THB/SGD exchange rate is significantly correlated with the world price of RSS3 (in 
domestic currency) at the 0.1 significance level and that all rice prices (in domestic currency) are not 
significantly correlated with the THB/USD exchange rate i.e. 0),( 11  titit eMCorr  and 
Corrit(Фt+1,et+1)=0. This finding is different from the findings of Kofman and Viaene (1991) and 
Gilbert (1991); it may be due to Thailand moving from a fixed exchange rate system to a managed-
float system in 1997. Thus, the optimal positions of traders and equilibrium prices in the Thai rubber 
market and the Thai rice market are different. That is, if the forward exchange market is biased, we 
expect to find a significant effect of exchange rates on the domestic price of RSS3 via currency 
trading and no significant effect on the domestic prices of rice. Otherwise, there should be no effect of 
exchange rates via currency hedging, but via offshore hedging, in both markets. As shown in the 
theoretical framework above and the proposition of Kawai and Zilcha (1986) as well as Kofman and 
Viaene (1991), to be persuaded to hold forward contracts, risk-averse traders have to receive a risk 
premium to compensate for the uncertainty regarding the expected future spot rate. In other words, the 
forward foreign exchange market is biased i.e. .)( 11   ttt feE   
 
                                                            
9This assumption can be justified by a rational expectations paradigm. That is, the conditional distribution for 
each agent comes from distributions of production shocks and storage uncertainty as well as the market-clearing 
condition determining Pt+1 and Qt+1 above. Agents know that the domestic commodity spot price is a linear 
function of production and storage uncertainty. These variables have constant variance-covariance matrices 
through time so do the distributions Ωit and Ωjt. As Qmt+1, Ft+1 and et+1 are exogenous, the covariance and 
variances of these variables are given and assumed to be constant. If the mean values of market prices are 
nonnegative, the rational agents' expected values of future prices will also be nonnegative. 
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[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
The heteroscedasticity-robusted standard error ordinary least square regression of  
ttt fe   110   in Table 3 shows that the forward exchange markets are biased and the current 
exchange rate depends on the previous forward rate. Trading in the forward exchange market can 
affect the optimal position of exporters in the rubber market i.e. the optimal spot position is given by 
Equation (1) if exporters choose to hedge their exchange rate risk. The optimal position of other 
traders in the rubber market and all traders in the rice market are express in Equation (2) if they hedge 
their price risk. As a result, the forward exchange rate is expected to have a significant effect on Thai 
rubber prices. Whether the intermediate and final commodity prices are affected by foreign futures 
prices depends on who trade in the foreign commodity futures market. 
Consequently, we estimate Equation (14) and (15) for both markets by assuming that all the 
terms in a coefficient (such as the degree of risk aversion, the number of traders and variances and 
covariances of prices) are constant. From equilibrium prices derived in the previous section, the 
current domestic spot price relates to the previous price. Due to data limitation and to simplify the 
model, we assume that the commodity prices follow AR(1) process. For example,  
11101 )(   tmttmtt eQeQE   and 111011 )()(   ttttttt eFeFEE  . Though more lags may 
be included to correct autocorrelation problem. Based on the test result above, the expected future 
exchange rate is a function of the current forward exchange rate, .)( 1101   ttt feE    
Equation (14) and (15) can be rewritten as  
 .61541131210 ptttttttttt fafaeFaeFaPaQaaP    (16) 
 .1761541131210 qttttttttttmtt QbfbfbeFbeFbPbeQbbQ    (17) 
a0 and b0  are the sums of the constant terms in the expectation functions, so they can be either 
positive or negative. Based on the theoretical result, a1 and b1 are expected be positive as Qt and Qmtet 
are used to forecast the future prices of outputs of processors and exporters, respectively.  Pt-1 is the 
input cost for farmers and storage companies selling the intermediate commodity at time t and Qt-1 is 
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the input cost for storage companies selling the final commodity at time t; both are also used to 
predict the future prices at time t.  Therefore, a2 and b7 can be positive, negative or insignificant. Pt-1 is 
also the input cost of processors, so b2 is expected to be positive. If producers hedge their price risks, 
the estimator of a3 is expected to be significant. The estimators of both a4 and b3 should be significant 
if processors hedge their price risk. If the companies storing intermediate commodity (final 
commodity) trade in the futures market, both a3 and a4 (b3 and b4) will be non-zero. In addition, a non-
zero value of b4 will indicate the effects of the foreign futures price and exchange rate on the domestic 
price of final commodity via exporters' foreign futures trading. If the exporters in the rubber market 
also trade in the forward exchange market, then b6 of (17) is expected to be positive if 
),(),(),( 111111   ttittitittitit eCorrMCorreMCorr . According to correlations between exchange 
rates and commodity prices reported in Table 2, estimates of a5, a6 and b5 are expected to be 
insignificant. The sign of coefficients of the foreign futures prices (in domestic currency) and the 
forward rates depend on (i) the value of  1   and  1  , (ii) who trades in the foreign futures commodity 
and forward exchange markets and (iii) whether the trader holds long or short positions in the 
markets. 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Applying the two-stage-least-squares estimation approach, the estimation results in Table 4 
and 5 show that commodity prices are affected by spot and forward exchange rates through exports 
and offshore hedging. For the Thai rubber market, removing insignificant variables and correcting for 
any multicollinearity10 or autocorrelation problem by adding more lags of domestic and world prices 
of RSS3 yields model RS4. The estimates of a1 and b1 are positive as expected. In addition, the 
estimates of a5, a6 and b5 are insignificant while the estimate of b6 is positive. This implies that 
exports hedge their price and exchange rate risks and that the forward exchange rate can affect the 
                                                            
10 Pt-1 and Qt-1 are highly correlated as shown in Table 2. 
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final commodity price through the optimal spot position of exporters only. The significance of the 
estimates of a4, b3 and b4 may indicate that all traders in the final commodity market hedge their price 
risks in the SICOM or use the futures price to predict the future spot price. Unlike the smoked rubber 
sheet market, producers and storage companies in the natural rubber sheet market do not hedge their 
risks, but use the futures price to predict the future spot price. 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
For the Thai rice market, removing the insignificant coefficients in Equation (17) we obtain 
models R2-R4. R2 does not have both Pt-1 and Qt-1 which are highly correlated while R3 has the first 
lag of intermediate goods price and R4 has the first lag of final goods price. R4 is chosen because all 
coefficients are significant, the model does not have heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation and mis-
specification problems, and it has the highest explanatory power. As expected, the estimates of a1 and 
b1 are positive. This indicates that processors and exporters of the final commodity use the current 
prices of that final commodity to predict the future price in the domestic and international market. 
Due to ),( 11  titit eMCorr and ),( 11  ttit eCorr  are insignificantly different from zero, estimates of 
a5, a6, b5 and b6 are insignificant as suggested by the theoretical framework. The significance of the 
estimate of b4 indicates that the exporters of the final commodity hedge their price risk in the CBOT 
or use the futures price to predict the future spot price. The model R4 shows that exchange rates have 
an effect on domestic commodity prices through offshore hedging and international trade by rice 
exporters even though commodity prices (in domestic currency) and exchange rates are uncorrelated. 
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
The models have remarkably high explanatory power. The graphs of fitted and actual values 
in Figure 2 show that the models fit the data very well.  ptˆ  and qtˆ  are the estimated residual of 
which statistics are summarised in Table 6. The statistics shows that the estimated residuals are 
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stationary and normally distributed with mean values equal to 0 and a constant variance as assumed in 
the theoretical framework. 
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
In short, this empirical analysis shows that the inefficiency of the forward exchange market 
and the correlation between the exchange rate and the world price of smoked rubber sheets allow the 
forward exchange rate to affect the domestic rubber prices. It also shows that producers in both 
markets do not hedge their price risk while exporters hedge their price and exchange rate risks in both 
markets. Rubber storage companies appear to hedge their price risk while rice storage companies do 
not; this may be because rough rice is stored by a government agency through a price guarantee 
program while there is no such program for rubber. 
 
4. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the framework is developed to find the optimal offshore trading strategy and 
determine how it affects the optimal spot commodity and forward foreign exchange positions. The 
framework expands the models of Kawai and Zilcha (1986) to explain trading by other trader types. It 
relaxes the assumptions of Kawai and Zilcha (1986) and Kofman and Viaene (1991) by allowing both 
intermediate and final goods to be traded in the international and future markets. As suggested by 
Kawai and Zilcha (1986), this framework allows exporters to face export shocks, factor costs and 
random export prices. Like other frameworks, traders are assumed to close all of their futures position 
due to high delivery and transaction costs. Then, equilibrium prices at maturity in the domestic 
commodity markets are derived to illustrate how offshore trading allows exchange rates to affect 
commodity prices in a country without its own commodity futures markets. 
Applying a two-period mean-variance approach, this framework shows that the changes in the 
futures price and the exchange rate as well as and volatilities can affect the spot positions and 
domestic prices of internationally tradable commodities in many cases. Firstly, traders hedge their 
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price risk in the foreign commodity futures market and exchange rate risk in the biased forward 
exchange markets and the commodity prices are correlated with the exchange rate. Secondly, 
exporters (importers) and traders hedging their price risk in the foreign futures market are interested in 
the profits dominated in domestic currency; the effects exist even though the forward exchange rate is 
an unbiased forecast of the future exchange rate or commodity prices and exchange rates are 
uncorrelated. Thirdly, traders use the foreign futures price as information in predicting future 
commodity prices. 
Like Kawai and Zilcha (1986), we find that without the correlation between commodity 
prices and exchange rates, the trader's optimal position in the forward exchange market is full hedging 
of his expected foreign currency payments and receipts and speculation in the domestic currency 
market. The optimal futures position is a partial hedge of the spot position, speculation in the futures 
market and the effect of speculation in the forward market. We also find that the separation theorem 
does not apply to the optimal spot position here. The spot position will be greater when the traders 
hedge their risks. Whether offshore hedging of all traders will be more effective when they hedge both 
price and currency risks depends on the correlations of commodity prices with the exchange rate. 
Increases in variances of prices and exchange rates can decrease traders' optimal spot and futures 
positions while a rise in the correlation between the domestic spot price and the foreign futures price 
can increase their optimal positions. Increases in the difference between the expected spot exchange 
rate and the forward exchange rate, exchange rate volatility, and correlations of exchange rates and 
domestic commodity prices can either increase or decrease the commodity spot price; this depends on 
which traders hedge their exchange rate risk and whether the effects of these changes on the supply is 
greater than the effects on the demand in the markets. 
The empirical results also support the theoretical conclusion. We find that the prices of Thai rice 
and rubber sheets are affected by exchange rates though exports and offshore hedging even though 
rice prices (in domestic currency) and the exchange rate are not correlated. Offshore hedging by 
different trader types leads to different impacts of foreign futures prices and foreign exchange rates on 
domestic commodity prices. With the bias of the forward exchange market and the significant 
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correlation between the exchange rate and the world price of RSS no.3, we find the effect of the 
forward exchange rate on the domestic price of smoked rubber sheets. The model also indicates that 
some traders hedge their price risk in the foreign futures market and some do not hedge their risk. 
Further research could test the prices of more commodities in different countries and calculate 
the optimal hedging ratios based on the optimal strategy found in this paper. Within the context of an 
international financial portfolio, Schmittmann (2010) found the optimal currency hedging ratios for 
investing in single-country portfolios and a multi-country portfolio and documented that both 
exchange rate volatility and the correlations of exchange rates with bond and equity returns could 
increase risk exposure to investors. So further theoretical research could expand the framework in this 
paper to find the optimal hedging ratio in the foreign futures equity market for investors holding 
shares of the firm which is listed on the stock exchange of a small country without its own futures 
market and which has futures contracts traded in the foreign futures market. Further research could 
also compare the optimal strategy, price volatility and trader's welfare before and after the existence 
of a domestic commodity futures market. Any finding from such a comparison would guide policy 
makers as to whether the country should have a domestic commodity futures market. Also, empirical 
work could be done using recent commodity prices to investigate how prices and trader behaviour 
change when a domestic commodity future market becomes available.  
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Appendix A 
The profit of the traders can be rewritten in a general form as  
}.)()({ 1111
2 f
itttt
f
itititititiititt
f
iti ZfeYSMSSCY     
He choose  Sit,Yit
f
  and  Zit
f
  at time by maximising his expected utility 
)]}.(
2
)([
2
{ 11
2
, ,



  ititiitititiitittfit
ZYY
i Var
AESSCYMaxV
f
itit
f
it
  
where the expected future profit is  
  fitttittitfititititittititit ZfeEEYMESMEE    )()()()()( 111111   
and the variance of his expected future profit is 
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Appendix B 
The effect of changes in price and exchange rate volatilities are as follows. 
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of which the sign is ambiguous as Corrit(Фt+1, et+1) can be positive, negative or zero. Thus, the effect 
of the volatility of the foreign futures price on the optimal spot position is ambiguous. 
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Its sign is ambiguous because the sign of the second term is ambiguous as 
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which can be positive, negative or zero.  
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if the effect of the expected gains of trading in the foreign futures market and the forward exchange 
market on the optimal spot position is non-negative. 
 
Appendix C 
1.  2)()( ABEABEABVar   
where A and B are random variables. Define  )(AEAX    and  ).(BEBY    Then,  
)(AEXA    and  ).(BEYB    Therefore, 
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2. Cov(AB, CD)  = E [AB − E(AB)] [CD − E(CD)] 
Suppose A = ΔA+E(A), B = ΔB+E(B), C = ΔC+E(C), D = ΔD+E(D) 
Cov(AB, CD) = E [ΔAΔB +ΔAE(B)+ΔBE(A)−Cov(A, B)]· [ΔCΔD +ΔCE(D)+ΔDE(C) −Cov(C, D)] 
                      = E[ΔAΔBΔCΔD + ΔAΔBΔCE(D) + ΔAΔBΔDE(C)−ΔAΔBCov(C, D)  
+ ΔAΔCE(B)E(D)+ΔAΔDE(B)E(C) − ΔAE(B)Cov(C, D)+ΔAΔCΔDE(B)  
+ ΔBΔCΔDE(A)+ΔBΔCE(A)E(D) + ΔBΔDE(A)E(C)−ΔBE(A)Cov(C, D)  
−ΔCΔDCov(A, B)−ΔCE(D)Cov(A, B) − ΔDE(C)Cov(A, B)+Cov(A, B)Cov(C, D)]  
With E[ΔAΔBΔCΔD] = Cov(A, B)Cov(C, D) + Cov(A, C)Cov(B, D)+ Cov(A, D)Cov(C, B), 
E[ΔA] =0, E[ΔB]=0, E[ΔC] =0, E[ΔD] =0, E[ΔAΔBΔCE(D)] = 0, E[ΔAΔBΔDE(C)] = 0, 
E[ΔAΔCΔDE(B)] = 0 and E[ΔBΔCΔDE(A)] = 0, we obtain  
Cov(AB, CD) = Cov(A, C)Cov(B, D) + Cov(A, D)Cov(B, C)+Cov(A, C)E(B)E(D)  
+ Cov(A, D)E(B)E(C)+Cov(B, C)E(A)E(D)+Cov(B, D)E(A)E(C) 
and Cov(AB, C) = Cov(A, C)E(B) + Cov(B, C)E(A).  
For example,  
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if Covit(Ft+1, et+1) = 0.  
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Table 1: the KPSS unit root test of variables 
Commodity Pt  Qt  Qmt  Qmtet  Ft  Ftet  et  f t  
Rubber 0.154 0.161  0.148  0.166 0.146 0.151  0.097  0.093 
Rice 0.181 0.175  0.191  0.184 0.186 0.177  0.115  0.108 
Note: The critical value at the 0.01 significance level is 0.216 
 
 
 
 Table 2: Correlations among commodity prices and exchange rates 
   Rubber     Rice  
  Pt    Qt    Qmtet    Ftet     Pt    Qt    Qmtet    Ftet   
 Qt    )162.75( 993.0   
    
 Qt    )016.14( 911.0   
    
 Qmtet   )480.25( 947.0    )952.26( 952.0   
   
 Qmtet  )323.12( 890.0    35.965
0.985
  
   
 Ftet    )794.37( 975.0    )151.43( 980.0    )820.35( 972.0   
   Ftet    )588.6( 721.0    )009.7( 742.0    )028.8( 786.0   
  
 et    )150.1( 132.0    )067.1( 122.0    )788.1( 202.0    )223.1( 140.0  et    )966.0( 151.0    )048.0( 008.0    )064.0( 010.0   )173.0( 027.0  
Note: The values in parentheses are t-statistics 
 
 
 
Table 3: Efficient market hypothesis testing of forward exchange markets 
Currency Market THB/SGD THB/USD  
Variable Coefficient (S.E.) Coefficient (S.E.)  
Constant 2.92 (1.36)* 22.36 (7.99)**  
 ft-1  0.88 (0.06)** 0.46 (0.20)*  
Adj-R2  84.80% 24.60%  
AR Test: F-stat (Prob.) 2.19 (0.13) 0.39 (0.68)  
Note: ** and * denote the significance of coefficients at 1% and 5% significance levels, respectively 
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Table 4: Regression results of the Thai rubber market 
Equation      Model RS1    Model RS2   Model RS3 Model RS4 
 Pt Constant  -10.50 (2.30)**  -11.84 (2.50)   -9.76 (2.54)** -0.44 (0.74) 
 Qt      2.16 (0.64)**       0.63 (0.12)**    1.67 (0.62)**  0.57 (0.14)** 
 Pt-1     -0.27 (0.16) †       0.05 (0.09)    0.27 (0.08)**  0.68 (0.14)** 
 Ft-1 et-1      -1.03 (0.47)*        1.87 (0.53)**  
 Ft et       -0.66 (0.43)    0.38 (0.14)**   2.03 (0.48)**  0.44 (0.18)* 
 ft-1      -0.01 (0.24)    
 ft       0.27 (0.28)    0.41 (0.11)**   0.44 (0.10)**  
 Ft-1           -0.55 (0.17)** 
Adj-R2         98.28%      98.02%      98.17%    98.21% 
Log likelihood        -111.55     -117.88     -114.46   -113.02 
Autocorrelation:  F-stat (prob.)     4.07 (0.02)    6.98 (0.00)    5.93 (0.00)  1.40 (0.25) 
 Qt Constant      0.65 (2.64)    1.11 (0.30)**    0.68 (0.37) †   -2.91 (2.12) 
  Qmtet      0.07 (0.05)     0.08 (0.04) †       0.09 (0.05) †    0.18 (0.08)* 
 Pt-1       0.29 (0.11)*   0.19 (0.05)**   
 Ft-1 et-1       0.76 (0.08)**    0.71 (0.06)**    0.76 (0.07)**  0.99 (0.16)** 
 Ft et        0.58 (0.10)**    0.55 (0.09)**    0.56 (0.10)**  0.53 (0.13)** 
 ft-1      -0.04 (0.19)                    
 ft       0.08 (0.24)    0.18 (0.09)* 
 Qt-1      -0.13 (0.11)            0.13 (0.06)*  0.31 (0.09)** 
 Qmt-1et-1           -0.20 (0.09)* 
 Qt-2           -0.21 (0.06)** 
Adj-R2   99.02% 99.04% 98.95% 99.15% 
Log likelihood  -95.97 -96.92 -100.19 -89.87 
Autocorrelation: F-stat (prob.) 4.50 (0.01) 4.66 (0.01) 11.12 (0.00) 3.04 (0.06) 
Mis-specification: LR-stat (prob.) 0.97 (0.32) 0.76 (0.38) 0.11 (0.74) 1.18 (0.28) 
Note: **, *,  †   denote the significance of coefficients at 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels, respectively 
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Table 5: Regression results of the Thai rice market 
Equation Variable Model R1 Model R2 Model R3 Model R4 
 Pt Constant 1084.03 (1027.87) 1084.16 (318.49)** 1102.59 (365.24)** 1140.78 (370.11)** 
 Qt        0.22 (0.07)**        0.27 (0.04)**       0.27 (0.03)**       0.28 (0.04)** 
 Pt-1        0.42 (0.17)*        0.37 (0.11)**       0.36 (0.10)**       0.35 (0.10)** 
 Ft-1 et-1        0.05 (0.06)                
 Ft et        -0.02 (0.06)                
 ft-1     -27.67 (17.36)            
 ft      26.47 (26.71)    
Adj-R2  84.79% 85.48% 85.49% 85.60% 
Log likelihood -292.62 -293.92 -293.92 -293.75 
Autocorrelation:  F-stat (prob.) 0.45 (0.64) 0.49 (0.61) 0.51 (0.60) 0.59 (0.56) 
 Qt Constant  -262.06 (974.63)    324.26 (785.98)   234.13 (369.61)   100.29 (241.04) 
 Qmtet        0.85 (0.06)**        0.89 (0.04)**      0.88 (0.04)**       0.84 (0.04)** 
 Pt-1        -0.11 (0.12)       0.03 (0.08)           
 Ft-1 et-1         0.02 (0.06)        0.11 (0.04)*      0.10 (0.06) †    
 Ft et         -0.06 (0.07)       -0.15 (0.06)*     -0.15 (0.06)*      -0.07 (0.04) †   
 ft-1       19.18 (19.73)            
 ft        -4.38 (22.27)                  
 Qt-1        0.10 (0.08)                  0.09 (0.03)** 
Adj-R2  97.43% 97.39% 97.33% 97.48% 
Log likelihood -290.22 -292.90 -292.84 -292.21 
Autocorrelation: F-stat (prob.) 0.75 (0.48) 0.39 (0.68) 0.36 (0.70) 0.80 (0.46) 
Mis-specification: LR- stat (prob.) 0.77 (0.38) 1.11 (0.29) 1.12 (0.29) 0.90 (0.34) 
Note: **, *,  †   denote the significance of coefficients at 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels, respectively 
 
Table 6: Descriptive statistics of estimated residuals 
Statistics of Residuals Rubber Equations Rice Equations 
  Pt    Qt    Pt    Qt   
Mean  15106.2     151092.5    131048.6    131011.6    
Standard Deviation  1.099   0.807    267.006    257.347  
Skewness -0.368   0.277    0.023   -0.439   
Kurtosis  2.821   2.399    2.213    2.678   
Jarque-Bera  1.793   2.085    1.088    1.530   
Prob.  0.408   0.353    0.580    0.465   
KPSS  0.175   0.112    0.084    0.061   
 H0 : the series is stationary    I(0)     I(0)         I(0)    I(0) 
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(a) Exporting Country     (b) Importing Country 
Figure 1: Trade flows of intermediate and final commodities 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Fitted and actual values of domestic commodity prices 
 
